We demonstrate how suppliers can take strategic speculative positions in derivatives markets to soften competition in the spot market. In our game, suppliers _rst choose a portfolio of call options and then compete with supply functions. In equilibrium _rms sell forward contracts and buy call options to commit to downward sloping supply functions. Although this strategy is risky, it reduces the elasticity of the residual demand of competitors, who increase their mark-ups in response. We show that this type of strategic speculation increases the level and volatility of commodity prices and decreases welfare.
Introduction
The trade in commodity derivatives is widespread and trading volumes often surpass that of the underlying commodities. 1 Ideally derivatives markets improve market eciency as they allow rms to manage risk and facilitate price discovery by aggregating information across market participants. 2 We show that derivatives trade increases spot market volatility and harms competition, when dominant producers trade futures and options contracts.
By trading nancial derivatives, strategic producers aect their own and their competitors' strategies, and therefore market competitiveness. We show that each producer uses derivatives to commit to a downward sloping supply function, i.e.
to produce more when prices are low and less when they are high. As illustrated in Figure 1 this commitment makes the residual demand curve for each of its competitors steeper (less price-sensitive) and induces them to increase mark-ups and reduce total output. In the aggregate, rms commit to a downward sloping supply function, which increases the volatility of the spot price as even a small demand shock will cause large price uctuations.
Without derivative trade, producers would oer upward-sloping supply functions in equilibrium. the spot price is high, as a reduction of the production level then increases its liability to a lower extent. A producer can achieve a portfolio with this property by trading option contracts.
A call option hedges the buyer against high spot prices; essentially it gives him the right to procure one unit of the good from the seller at a predetermined price, the option's strike price. The contract is only exercised when the spot price is above the strike price. By selling a carefully designed portfolio of calloption contracts a producer can fully hedge its risk, that is, ensure that changes in operational prot are perfectly oset by changes in the liability of its contracting portfolio. The advantage of selling a portfolio of call options is that in contrast to a forward contract, which only hedge price risk, they can also be used to hedge volume risk (Bessembinder and Lemon, 2002; Willems and Morbee, 2010 ). But we show that a producer instead has incentives to commit to a supply function with a negative slope by selling a forward contract and by buying a portfolio of call options with a range of strike prices. 5 The forward contract is a promise for future delivery, which creates a liability for the producer. As the spot price increases, the producer will also exercise an increasing amount of call options, and thus partially oset its forward position. So the producer will successively reduce its hedged output (net-sales with contracts) or equivalently the sensitivity of its liability, as the spot price increases. This is a risky strategy, but it will increase the rm's expected prot.
Until recently a handful of electricity producers in the Nordic countries reg-5 It follows from the put-call parity that this can also be achieved with a portfolio of forward contracts and put options.
3 ularly made oers that were (partly) downward sloping. 6 Market observers have attributed those irregular bids to the option contracts of those producers, but it has been a puzzle why producers took those risky contract position in the rst place. In this paper we identify a mechanism that could explain this. Perhaps producers use contracts to commit to a downward sloping supply in order to soften competition? Related results are found in an empirical study of the German electricity market by Willems et al. (2009) . They nd no evidence of producers selling call option contracts or equivalent contracts to hedge their output. 7 This is in line with our results as we predict that rms have no incentive to sell call option contracts, but to buy them instead.
In their seminal paper, Allaz and Vila (1993) analyze a strategic contracting game, where risk-neutral rms rst sell forward contracts and then compete on quantities in a spot market with certain demand. However, this setting is too restrictive to capture producers' incentives to commit to downward sloping supply functions. A concern is therefore that Allaz and Vila's work has lead to the overly optimistic view that allowing for contracting will automatically improve market competitiveness. Thus we generalize Allaz and Vila's two-stage game by allowing for price contingent contracts and price contingent supply oers. In the rst stage, oligopoly producers choose a portfolio of call option contracts with a range of strike prices. In the second stage, they compete with supply functions in a spot market with uncertain demand as in Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and Green and Newbery (1992) . Like us, Chao and Wilson (2005) consider the inuence of option contracts on supply function competition, but contracting is exogenous in their model.
In contrast to Allaz and Vila (1993) total surplus decreases when the nancial market is introduced in our model. This anti-competitive eect is partly mitigated when demand uncertainty increases. With more demand uncertainty/variation it is optimal for rms to oer supply functions that have a less negative slope, as this allows them to benet more from both high and low demand realizations. Thus to avoid the anti-competitive eect of speculation, this suggests that option contracts should not be traded near delivery because rms then have a good estimate of demand. Alternatively, the same option contract or supply function should be valid for several delivery periods in order to increase the range of demand levels that contracts needs to cover.
The results of our paper have some parallels in the literature on delegation games. The main dierences between our paper and the delegation literature is that we use nancial contracts instead of delegation as the commitment device, 6 Downward sloping supply bids were allowed in the Nordic power exchange (Nord Pool) until it introduced a new clearing algorithm on October 10, 2007 that could no longer handle them. Total supply of a rm consists of its supply in the power exchange plus its supply delivered directly to consumers with bilateral contracts. So if bilaterally contracted supply is suciently downward sloping, total supply could still be downward sloping, even if the power exchange itself does not allow for downward sloping supply bids.
7 Willems et al. (2009) compare two contracting scenarios for the German electricity market: one with standard forward contracts and another with load following contracts. The latter corresponds to rms selling forward contracts and several call option contracts such that the same fraction of output is hedged for each price level in the spot market. They nd that the rst scenario ts the data best.
and that we allow rms to commit to supply functions with any slope. Singh and Vives (1984) and Cheng (1985) analyze a game where the owner of each rm rst decides the slope of its supply. The slope is either horizontal (Bertrand) or vertical (Cournot). The implementation of this decision is delegated to the rm's manager, who sets either the rm's price or its output depending on the owner's choice. In equilibrium, each rm commits to play Cournot when demand is certain. As in our model, this makes the residual demand function of competitors less elastic, it softens competition and leads to higher mark-ups. Reisinger and Ressner (2009) show that if demand is suciently uncertain, rms commit to play Bertrand. Thus as in our model, uncertainty makes the market more competitive.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 summarizes the previous literature. The model of strategic option contracting is introduced in Section 3 and its main properties are derived in Section 4. Section 5 presents closed-form results when demand is linear and demand shocks are Pareto distributed of the second-order. Section 6 concludes.
2
Literature review
Most oligopoly models with strategic commitments can be analyzed in the framework developed by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Bulow et al. (1985) . A rm maximizes its prot by committing to a strategy that softens the response of its competitors. Firms commit to aggressive spot market bidding (high output or low mark-up) if it results in a soft response from competitors (low output or high mark-up), which is, by denition, the case when strategies are substitutes. On the other hand, rms commit to peaceable (soft) spot market bidding if this results in a soft response from competitors.
The seminal paper on strategic forward contracting by Allaz and Vila (1993) is an example of a game with strategic substitutes. They analyze a two-stage game with a homogeneous good. In the rst stage producers sell contracts to non-strategic consumers or nancial traders. The contracts are disclosed, so they are observable.
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In the second stage producers compete in a Cournot market.
The set-up introduces a prisoners' dilemma for producers: Each producer will sell forward contracts to commit to a large output. This gives it a Stackelberg rst-mover advantage, which would reduce competitors' output, if they would not have sold any forward contracts themselves. However, in equilibrium all rms sell forward contracts, spot market competition becomes tougher, and producers end up worse o. Thus endogenous contracting is pro-competitive and welfare 8 Contracting is strategic when rms are risk-averse or when contract positions are observable (Hughes and Kao, 1997) . Financial trading is anonymous in most markets, and a rm's contract positions are normally not revealed to competitors. Still competitors can get a rough estimate of the rm's forward position by analyzing the turnover in the forward market and the forward price (Ferreira, 2006 ). Ferreira's theoretical argument is also relevant in practice. Van Eijkel and Moraga-González's (2010) nd that rms in the Dutch gas market are able to infer competitors' contract positions and that contracts are used for strategic rather than hedging reasons. Finally, it can be noted that vertical integration with a retailer that is selling the good at a xed retail price is equivalent to observable contracting. 5 increasing when rms compete on quantities.
9 Brandts et al. (2008) conrm this result in economic experiments.
However, introducing a forward market worsens competition when strategies are complements, i.e. when an aggressive commitment results in an aggressive spot market response from competitors. Mahenc and Salanié (2004) analyze a market with dierentiated goods and price competition, and show that a commitment to low mark-ups, due to forward sales, is met with a tough response, that is competitors also lower their mark-ups. To avoid the tough response, rms buy in the forward market (negative contracting) in order to soften competition in the spot market. This increases mark-ups in the spot-market. Thus, forward trading reduces social welfare when strategies are complements.
In a more generalized form of spot market competition, producers compete with supply functions under demand uncertainty, as in the supply function equilibrium (SFE) model (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989) . The setting of the SFE model is obviously well-suited for markets where producers sell their output in a uniform-price auction, as in wholesale electricity markets (Green and Newbery, 1992; Holmberg and Newbery, 2010) . This has also been empirically veried.
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Although most markets are not explicitly cleared by uniform-price auctions, Klemperer and Meyer (1989) argue that rms typically face a uniform market price and they need predetermined decision rules for its lower-level managers on how to deal with changing market conditions. Thus rms implicitly commit to supply functions also in the general case. Indeed, Vives (2011) Allaz and Vila (1993) also show that the perfectly competitive outcome is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if contracting is repeated an innite number of rounds. However, Ferreira (2003) proves that this outcome is not renegotiation-proof, while the monopolistic outcome is. 10 Hortacsu and Puller, (2008) , Sioshansi and Oren, (2007) and Wolak (2003) verify that large producers in the electricity market roughly bid as predicted by the SFE model.
11 Newbery (1998) shows that producers sells contracts to keep output high and spot prices low to deter entry. Murphy and Smeers (2010) show that the impact of forward contracts on competition is ambiguous once investment decisions are endogenized. In Argenton and Willems (2010) rms sell standard forward contracts to exclude potentially more ecient entrants, and Petropoulos et al. (2010) show that nancial contracts might lead to preemptive overinvestments by incumbent rms. 6 shock distribution, so that the spot market has a unique equilibrium. He shows that contracting strategies are weakly pro-competitive when marginal costs are constant. Herrera-Dappe (2008) calculates asymmetric contracting equilibria and in his setting forward trading will decrease welfare.
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In our setting rms trade option contracts, so the contracted quantity is contingent on the spot price. This is the main dierence in our study compared to the above mentioned studies. Similarly, Willems (2005) generalizes Allaz and Vila's (1993) result by considering rms that sell a bundle of call option contracts, but Willems keeps the Cournot setting in the spot market. As in Allaz and Vila (1993) 
Model
We model producers' contracting and supply strategies as a two-stage game. In the rst stage, N risk-neutral producers commit by strategically choosing a portfolio of call option contracts with a spectrum of strike prices. Firms' contracting decisions are made simultaneously. Similar to Allaz and Vila (1993) , Newbery (1998), Green (1999) etc., producers disclose their contracting decisions. Riskneutral, non-strategic counterparties (e.g. consumers or investment banks) with rational expectations ensure that each option price corresponds to the expected value of the contract. This rules out any arbitrage opportunities in the market. In 12 Anderson and Xu (2005; 2006) , Anderson and Hu (2012) , Aromi (2007) , Chao and Wilson (2005) and Niu et al. (2005) have also analyzed how exogenously given forward or option contracts inuence supply function competition. But they do not analyze to what extent contracting is strategically driven.
13 A similar pro-competitive mechanism occurs when each rm oers its forward contracts with a supply function in the contract market (Green, 1999; Holmberg, 2011) . Then a rm has incentives to sell forward contracts in order to reduce the forward price and competitors' forward sales. the second stage, rms compete in the spot market. It is a uniform-price auction in which sellers simultaneously submit supply functions. After these oers have been submitted, an additive demand shock is realized. The distribution of the shock is common knowledge.
A nancial call option gives the buyer the right to receive the dierence between the spot market price and a predetermined strike price r.
14 The contract is exercised when the spot price is above the strike price. In stage 1, rm i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N } decides how many option contracts to sell at each strike price. We assume that 0 and p are the lowest and highest realized prices in the market, respectively.
The contracting decision is represented by the right-continuous distribution function X i (r) : [0, p] → R, the amount of option contracts sold with a strike price equal to or below r. A forward contract corresponds to a call option with strike price zero, as it is always exercised. Thus X i (0) is the amount of sold forward contracts. Firm i can decide to go short (
represent the contracting decision of the industry and
Let σ (r) be the price of an option with strike price r in the contracting market. Producer i's revenue from selling call options in the contracting market is given by:
All call options that are in the money, i.e. the spot price is above the strike price, will be exercised. Thus for a given spot price p, the total value V i (p) of rm i's sold contracts is given by:
Note that the sensitivity of this contract payment with respect to the spot price (the delta of the sold portfolio) is exactly equal to X i (p) dV i (p) dp = X i (p).
(1)
For a given spot price p and output q, rm i's prot from trading in the contract and the spot markets is equal to the revenue from sold contracts V i and spot market sales p q, minus the cost of exercised contracts V i (p) and the production cost
( 2) 14 It can be shown that our results are identical under physical contracts. A physical call option commits the writer/seller to deliver the good at the strike price r. The buyer exercises the contract for spot prices above r. The total output of a producer is given by the sum of its sales with bilateral physical contracts and its accepted sales in the spot market exchange. 15 We use the Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral, which is standard in probability theory, to integrate over the contract positions. 16 Note that P (ε) − r is continuous in r. The second equality follows from the integration by parts formula for the Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral, where one of the factors is continuous at each point (Hewitt and Stromberg, 1965) . Similar to Green and Newbery (1992) , and Klemperer and Meyer (1989) we assume that the cost function C i (q) is common knowledge, increasing, convex and twice dierentiable.
Each producer's supply decision in stage 2, the spot market, is represented by a right-continuous supply function denoted by Q i (p). We assume that Q i (p) and X i (p) are twice dierentiable on (0, p) and continuous at p. We let Q (p) = N i=1 Q i (p) be the total output of the industry and
As in Klemperer and Meyer (1989) , demand D(p, ε) is realized after oers to the spot market have been submitted. The demand function is twice dierentiable with respect to the spot price p and is subject to an exogenous additive shock, ε.
Hence,
The demand function is concave (
as the residual demand of rm i when the demand shock is zero, ε = 0. When rms make their contracting decisions in the rst stage, the shock density and its probability distribution are given by f (ε) and F (ε), respectively. The shock density has support on [0, ε] and on this interval f (ε) is dierentiable and positive, f (ε) > 0. The variance of the demand shock is bounded.
For any given demand shock, ε, the spot price is implicitly dened by the market clearing condition: aggregate supply should be equal to total demand.
The price function P (ε) maps the demand shock ε, to the market equilibrium price p.
To guarantee existence of an equilibrium price, we assume as in Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and Vives (2011) that all agents' prots will be zero if the market does not clear.
Thus rm i's expected prot from trading in the contract and the spot markets is:
As in Allaz and Vila (1993) risk-neutral, price-taking consumers or investment banks trade in the contract market and ensure that the following non-arbitrage condition is satised for each strike price r.
Hence, the value of the call option is equal to the expected second stage payment from the contract.
Analysis
We solve the game by means of backward induction. The properties of Nash equilibria in the second stage spot market are analyzed in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we rely on non-arbitrage conditions to derive the expected prot in stage 1 given the contracting position of rms. Our equilibrium concept and solution method for the two stage game is discussed in detail in Section 4.3, before we derive conditions for optimal contracting in Section 4.4.
The spot market
In the second stage of the game, each rm i observes its competitors' portfolio of option contracts and then chooses its supply function Q i (p) to maximize the rm's expected prot given the competitors' spot market bids Q −i (p). Our rst proposition generalizes the rst-order condition in Klemperer and Meyer (1989) , so that it applies to a producer holding a portfolio with a range of option contracts:
Proposition 1 (FOC Spot Market) The necessary rst-order conditions (FOC) for a Nash equilibrium in the spot market are given by the following system of ordinary dierential equations:
Proof. Firm i chooses its bid function Q i (p) to maximize its expected prot.
Substituting the market clearing condition
The rst order condition can be found by pointwise dierentiation of the integrand with respect to p = P (ε). Using expression (2) for rm i's prot, we derive the marginal eect of a price increase for a given demand shock ε.
A price increase gives a higher spot market revenue for existing quantities, Q i (p), but it increases the payment rm i needs to make for its contracted obligation,
Moreover, a price increase will reduce sales volumes, which reduces prots by p|D i (p)|, but the lower volume will also lead to production cost savings equal to
The generalized Klemperer and Meyer equations (6) follow from equating this expression to zero ( dπ i dp
The following proposition species a sucient condition for the solution of the system of rst order conditions (FOC) to be a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (NE Spot Market)
which satises the rst order conditions of the second stage game, i.e. the generalized Klemperer and Meyer equations (6) constitutes a Nash equilibrium (NE) in the second-stage if:
1. The slope of total supply is larger than the slope of the demand functioň Q (p) > D (p) on the price interval (0, p). This ensures that clearing prices are unique.
2. Each rm i faces a downward sloping residual demand function or has sufciently at marginal cost functions.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary rm i. It takes contract positions {X i (p)} N i=1 as given and assumes that its competitors bidQ −i (p) as supply. Thus rm i is facing the residual demandĎ i (p) + ε. We prove that biddingQ i (p) is prot maximizing for rm i. When demand shock ε * occurs, the market price is p * if rm i makes the oeř
We will prove that rm i's prot reaches a global maximum at p * along its residual demandĎ i (p) + ε * for every shock outcome ε * .
That is, producingQ i (p * ) is ex-post optimal for rm i.
With the oerQ i (p), the rst-order condition in (6) is satised for every price.
Subtracting it from (7) yields:
According to the mean value theorem there must exist ξ ∈ [ 
The second condition implies thatĎ i (p) · C i (ξ) ≤ 1. So the second factor of the expression is always positive. The market clears at price p * when rm i oerš Q i (p), so the rst factor is zero when p = p * . The rst condition implies thať
, so the rst factor is negative when prices p are above p * and positive for prices below p * . Hence we have shown that:
which is sucient for a global prot maximum at p * . We can use the same argument for all shocks ε and all rms i and we can conclude that the tupleQ
constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3 If rm i sold call options that trace its marginal cost, (that is p = C i (X i (p)) ∀p ∈ (0, p)), then it bids competitively in the spot market and has constant prots, provided it has strictly increasing marginal costs and faces a downward sloping residual demand function or has suciently at marginal cost functions. That is D i (p) C i (q) < 1 ∀q ≥ 0 and ∀p ∈ (0, p).
Proof. It is obvious that bidding Q i (p) = X i (p) satises the necessary rst order conditions in Proposition 1. It is also a global optimum for rm i, if the two conditions in Proposition 2 are satised. By assumption we have p
Hence the rst condition is satised. The second condition is satised by assumption. Given this bidding strategy, rm i's prot is constant:
This can shown by partial integration or by studying Figure 2. Thus a rm can sell a portfolio that hedges its prot perfectly, but as a result, it will end up selling at marginal cost. If a rm would like to use its market power, it should not hedge all of its capacity.
First Period Prot function under perfect arbitrage
The no-arbitrage condition (5) is valid for any contracting choice of the producers.
By using the arbitrage condition and reversing the order of integration, we can rewrite the contracting revenue of rm i:
Thus due to perfect arbitrage, the contracting revenue is equal to the expected realized value of the portfolio. Substituting the expected contract revenue (9) into the pay-o (4) and simplifying we obtain:
Thus similar to Allaz and Vila (1993) and Newbery (1998) etc., rm i's pay-o does not depend on the contract position directly, but by selling contracts (X i ), it can strategically change the price in the spot market P (ε). Klemperer and Meyer (1989) show that multiple Nash Equilibria (NE) may exist in supply function games such as the one played in the second stage of our model. This complicates the equilibrium analysis of our game. Before proceeding we therefore discuss how we rene the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) concept, and which solution method we will follow to nd such an equilibrium.
Equilibrium concept and solution method

Equilibrium concept
We start with some denitions. Each tuple of contracting actions X= {X i (p)} N i=1 denes a dierent subgame in the second stage spot market, which we denote as subgame X. The set of subgames will be denoted Ξ. Firm i's strategy {X i (p) , Q i (p, X)} species its action in the rst stage (the contract market) and in each second stage subgame (the spot market). The strategy prole, the set of all rms' strategies, is given by {X, Q(X)}, where Q(X) = {Q i (p, X)} N i=1 species a tuple of supply functions for each subgame X. We let SF E(X) be the set of Supply Function Equilibria in subgame X. To rule out non-credible threats in the subgames, we solve for a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in the two-stage game.
Denition 1 (SPNE) A strategy prole {X * , Q * (X)} constitutes a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) i:
The rst equation species that rms do not have an incentive to change their contracting decisions in the rst stage, given competitors' contracting strategies X * −i and the equilibria which will be played in the second stage, as described by Q * (X). The second equation states that the function Q * (X) has to be an equilibrium in each subgame.
There can be multiple SPNE when subgames do not have unique equilibria. In this case, we would like to use Pareto dominance to rene the set of Nash equilibria in subgames with multiple Nash Equilibria. A problem with this renement is that it can only be applied to games where Pareto Optimal NE exists in every subgame.
Although the set SF E(X) is typically non-empty, it might not be closed, so a Pareto optimal SF E might not exist in some subgames X.
Denition 2 (ε-Pareto Optimality) A Supply Function Equilibrium Q * ∈ SF E(X) in subgame X is −Pareto optimal if no alternative equilibrium Q ∈ SF E(X) exists which is weakly preferred by all rms Π i (Q, X) − Π i (Q * , X) ≥ 0, and where one rm j would gain at least , π j (Q, X) − π j (Q * , X) > . The supply function equilibrium is Pareto optimal if it holds for = 0.
For a given > 0, we dene SF E −P O (X) andSF E P O (X) as the set of -Pareto Optimal SFE and Pareto Optimal SFE in subgame X.
Denition 3 [ε-PO-SPNE] For a given ≥ 0, a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) {X * , Q * (X)} is an −Pareto Optimal subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium ( -PO-SPNE) if:
If those expressions hold for = 0, the SPNE is a Pareto Optimal subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium (PO-SPNE).
This denition requires that rms play a Pareto Optimal Nash equilibrium along the equilibrium path, while o the equilibrium path, they are allowed to play any Nash equilibrium which is not -dominated by other Nash equilibria in the subgame. So by coordinating on another Nash equilibrium in a subgame o the equilibrium path, no rm can gain more than without making some other rm worse o. 18 Note that if each subgame has a unique Nash equilibrium, then any SPNE is also a PO-SPNE and an -PO-SPNE.
Solution method
In order to nd subgame perfect Nash equilibria, the set of supply function equilibria in each sub-game needs to be determined. However, the necessary rst order and sucient second order conditions in Propositions 1 and 2 do not describe all equilibria. In our paper we therefore rst solve an Equilibrium Program with 18 The Pareto Perfect Equilibrium (PPE) (Bernheim et al., 1987) is related with the PO-SPNE concept, but is a stricter renement as it imposes that only those PO-SPNE are played which are Pareto Optimal in the rst stage. Hence, the set of PPE is a subset of the set of PO-SPNE. In case a PO-SPNE is unique, then it is also a Pareto Perfect Equilibrium (PPE).
Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC). This solution method is often used to compute equilibria of dynamic games, including games with strategic contracting. 19 It is assumed that each rm maximizes its prot subject to the First Order Conditions (the Equilibrium Constraints ). In the next step we then verify that the solutions of the equilibrium program are SPNE. In particular we will show that an EPEC solution has similar properties as an -PO-SPNE, which we dened in Section 4.3.1.
We dene an outcome as a set of actions that rms take along one particular path in the game. Hence we present an outcome as {X 0 , Q 0 }; the contract curves
that rms oer in the rst and second stage, respectively. Let F OC (X) be the set of tuples Q(X) in subgame X that satisfy the necessary rst order conditions of an SFE as specied in Proposition 1. Thus SF E(X) ⊆ F OC (X).
A Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC, Luo et al., 1996) is an optimization program where a rm maximizes its prot, subject to a set of rst order conditions (the equilibrium constraints).
Denition 4 (MPEC Outcome) An outcome {X * , Q * } is an MPEC outcome for rm i i it is a solution of rm i's Mathematical Program with Equilibrium constraints (MPEC)
An Equilibrium Program with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) is the system of MPECs, one for each rm i.
Denition 5 (EPEC Equilibrium) An outcome {X * , Q * } is an EPEC outcome i ∀i, {X * , Q * } is an MPEC outcome for rm i. We say that {X * , Q * } is an EPEC equilibrium if in addition Q * ∈ SF E(X * ).
It can be shown that the EPEC equilibrium is closely related to the concept of an -PO-SPNE of a dynamic game:
Proposition 4 If there exists an SFE in every sub game, i.e. ∀X : SF E(X) = ∅, and the monopoly prot is bounded in every subgame, then an EPEC equilibrium {X * , Q * } is on the equilibrium path of an -PO-SPNE for any > 0.
Proof.
Step 1: We rst prove that the EPEC equilibrium implies that a Pareto Optimal SFE is played along the equilibrium path, i.e. Q * (X * ) ∈SF E P O (X * ).
We will use a proof by contradiction. Suppose that there is a Nash equilibrium
where the inequality is strict for one of the rms. Without loss of generality assume that for rm 1: Π 1 (Q, X * ) > Π 1 (Q * , X * ). The denition of the EPEC outcome requires that:
As the rst order conditions are necessary conditions for an equilibrium, we must have thatQ ∈ F OC(X * ). Hence,
which is a contradiction.
Step 2: We will now prove that in every subgame X, and for each > 0 
would not be the least-upper bound of equilibrium industry prots in subgame X. We now prove by contradiction that the SFE Q is -Pareto Optimal. Suppose it were not, then there exist an alternative SFEQ ∈ SF E(X) such that some rm i improves its prot by at least , Π i (Q, X) − Π i (Q , X) > while other rms j = i receive at least as much as before Π j (Q, X) − Π j (Q , X) ≥ 0. This implies however that Π I (Q, X) > Π I (Q , X) + ≥ Π sup (X), which is impossible given the denition of Π sup (X).
Step 3: It follows from step 2 that we can always nd an -Pareto optimal supply function equilibrium Q (X) ∈ SF E ε−P O (X) in each subgame, while the equilibrium Q * is played along the equilibrium path X * , i.e. Q (X * ) = Q * , according to step 1. In order to prove that {X * , Q (X)} is an -PO-SPNE, it remains to show that deviations from X * in the rst stage are not protable. As the rst order conditions are necessary conditions for an equilibrium, we must have that Q (X) ∈ F OC(X). Denition 5 implies that rm i has no protable deviation
Thus we can conclude from Denitions 1 and 3 that {X * , Q (X)} is an -PO-SPNE.
Strategic contracting
In this subsection we solve for equilibrium contracts. In order to simplify our notation we let
be the inverse hazard rate of the probability distribution of the demand shock multiplied by N (N − 1), which is a measure of the interaction eect between 16 rms. For simplicity we set cost equal to zero in the remainder of the paper. We also make a weak assumption on H(x).
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Assumption 1 1. Production costs are zero, i.e. C i (Q i ) ≡ 0, ∀i 2. The inverse hazard rate is decreasing or mildly increasing, H (ε) < 1 ∀ε ∈ (0, ε), i.e. the hazard rate is increasing or mildly decreasing.
Firm k maximizes prot by trading derivatives in stage 1, taking into account that the spot market outcome should satisfy the generalized Klemperer and Meyer FOC conditions (6) , and that clearing of the spot market requires that spot demand must equal spot supply. Under Assumption 1 rm k's expected prot in the rst stage in (10) can be simplied to E ε [P (ε) Q k (P (ε))]. Hence, rm k's optimal contracting level is determined by the following MPEC problem.
s.t.
In order to calculate the contracting levels in equilibrium, we solve for an EPEC outcome, i.e. an outcome which satises each rm's MPEC problem as dened in (12). The next Proposition provides necessary rst order conditions and a sucient condition for a symmetric solution to be an EPEC outcome.
Proposition 5 (EPEC outcome) Under Assumption 1 any symmetric solution of the EPEC dened as the set of MPEC(k) problems k = 1...N in Equation (12) has to satisfy the following rst order conditions:
for ε (p) ∈ [ε, ε]. Solutions to these equations are EPEC outcomes. That is, for each rm i, playing X i globally solves its MPEC(i) problem.
Step 1: Without loss of generality we solve for the optimal contract of rm k = 1. In the optimal control problem, X 1 (p) only appears in the rst constraint for i = 1. This implies that this constraint is never going to be binding, as rm 1 can freely choose X 1 (p) to satisfy this equation without inuencing other 20 Most standard probability distributions, such as the normal and uniform distributions, have increasing hazard rates. According to Bulow and Klemperer (2002) it is therefore a weak assumption to only consider probability distributions with increasing hazard rates, i.e. decreasing inverse hazard rates, H (ε) ≤ 0. Note that our assumption is even weaker, as we allow for
constraints or the objective function. In the objective function and in the second and third constraints, competitors' total output matters, but not how it is divided between these rms. We can therefore sum up the remaining (N − 1) equations (for cases i = 1) of the rst constraint into one single constraint. Using that F (ε (p)) = 1 and integration by parts we can now rewrite the dynamic optimization problem as follows:
where, as before, the subscript −i refers to the sum of a variable over all rms, excluding rm i. Thus rm 1's expected prot is given by the integral of its marginal prot ∂ ∂p (p Q 1 (p)) at price p, weighted by 1 − F (ε(p)), the probability that the realized price is larger than p, and this also makes sense intuitively.
Step 2: We simplify the dynamic optimization problem by rewriting the constraints and then substituting them into the objective function. By adding the constraint (17) and N − 1 times constraint (18) we get:
We use the identity in (18) to write (pQ −1 ) as a function of (pQ 1 ) .
(pQ −1 ) = (pD) + (pε) − (pQ 1 ) , which we can substitute into (19), to give an expression for the marginal prot
Substituting this marginal prot into the objective function in (16) gives the following optimization problem:
Step 3: We now derive the rst order conditions of the optimization program (20). First we write it as the sum of two integrals:
where G(ε) =´ε 0 (1 − F (t))dt. Note that (G (ε)) is zero and that ε (p) = ε. Thus the second term can be rewritten using integration by parts:
dp.
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The integrand only depends on ε (p) and p, so we can maximize the integral by maximizing θ (p, ε) for each p. Thus for every p we want to nd the ε (p) that maximizes θ (p, ε).
Setting ∂θ(p,ε) ∂ε = 0 and multiplying the equation with
, the rst order condition of this optimization problem can be written as:
Step 4: We want to know under what circumstances solutions to this condition globally maximize prots. Let ε (p) be a solution to this equation for a given contracting choice of the competitors, X −1 (p). We see from (21) that ∂θ(p,ε) ∂ε has the same sign as H(ε(p)) − N h 1 (p) + N ε (p). It follows from Assumption 1.2 that H (ε) < 1. Thus we realize that for all price levels p:
Accordingly, ε (p) globally maximizes θ at each price. We can repeat the argument for any rm and thus solutions to (22) are EPEC outcomes according to Denition 5.
Step 5: We now solve for symmetric equilibria. Multiplying equation (19) with N , and assuming symmetry we nd
Substituting the market clearing identity Q(p) = D(p) + ε for Q, we obtain equation (15). Reinserting the denition of h 1 (p) in (20) into the rst order condition (22) and assuming symmetry (N X −i = (N − 1)X) we nd
Substituting X with equation (15) gives the dierential equation in (13). Equation (14) describes the market clearing condition.
The two following propositions prove that the EPEC outcome in Proposition 5 is an EPEC equilibrium that is on the equilibrium path of an -PO SPNE.
Proposition 6 The EPEC outcome in Proposition 5 is an EPEC equilibrium.
Proof. It follows from Denition 5 that the EPEC outcome is an EPEC equilibrium if the two conditions in Proposition 2 are satised. Marginal costs are zero according to Assumption 1.1 so the second condition is satised. It remains to show that the rst condition Q > D or equivalently ε (p) > 0 is satised.
First we want to verify that ε (0) > 0. We rewrite the rst order condition (13) and evaluate it at p = 0:
We use l'Hopital's rule and collect the terms with ε (0) to nd
The second factor on the left hand side is positive given Assumption 1.2. It follows from the assumed properties of the demand function in Section 3 that the right hand side is also positive, as D (0) < 0. Thus we must have that ε (0) > 0.
In the next step we show that whenever ε (p) = 0 for a given strictly positive price p > 0, it must be that ε (p) > 0. Dierentiating the rst order condition (13) with respect to p, we nd
For price levels where ε = 0, this expression simplies to:
It follows from the assumed properties of the demand function in Section 3 that (pD) ≤ 0. Thus the right hand side is positive. We consider strictly positive prices, so it must be that ε (p) > 0 when ε = 0.
In the last step we show that ε (p) > 0 for all prices. Our proof is by contradiction. Assume that the inequality ε (p) > 0 is violated for some p > 0. Let p 0 be the lowest price above 0 where ε (p) = 0. Thus our assumptions would imply that ε (p) > 0 for p ∈ [0, p 0 ) and that ε (p 0 ) = 0, which requires that ε (p 0 ) ≤ 0. However, this is impossible as we have just shown that whenever ε (p 0 ) = 0 it must be that ε
Proposition 7 The EPEC outcome in Proposition 5 is on the equilibrium path of an -PO SPNE for any > 0.
Proof. It follows from Proposition 6 that the EPEC outcome in Proposition 5
is an EPEC equilibrium. We know from Proposition 4 that the EPEC equilibrium is on the equilibrium path of an -PO SPNE if (1) the monopoly payo is bounded and (2) there exist an SFE in every subgame. We prove that both conditions hold.
Let γ = −D (0) > 0. Thus it follows from the assumed properties of the demand function in Section 3 that
We realize that the monopoly prot for demand D (p) is bounded by the monopoly prot for demand −γp. In the latter case, the monopolist would set a monopoly price P (ε) = ε 2γ and receive a monopoly prot π M (ε) = ε 2 4γ . In expectation this monopoly prot is:
In Section 3 we make the assumption that ε has a bounded variance, so the expected monopoly prot must also be bounded.
Finally we note that Bertrand oers at p = 0 constitute a Nash equilibrium in every subgame irrespective of contracting. If competitors' total oers meet maximum demand at p = 0, then the prot of a rm is always zero irrespective of its oer, and it might as well choose its supply oer such that its total output meets maximum demand at p = 0. Thus the Bertrand outcome is always an equilibrium.
For a better understanding of the strategic interactions in our game, we take a brief look at rm 1's residual demand function. It is equal to total demand (term I) minus output of competitors, which is the production that they sell in the contract market (Term II) and in the spot market (Term III).
It follows from the generalized Klemperer and Meyer conditions (6) that competitors' net-sales in the spot market are proportional to the slope of their residual demand function. Thus term III can be written as follows
which gives the following residual demand function for rm i:
If demand is more elastic (|D | larger in term III.a) then the output of its N − 1 competitors will be larger, and the residual demand that rm 1 faces decreases.
Similarly, if rm 1's output is atter (Q 1 is large in Term III.b), the output of its competitors' increases, and its residual demand decreases. Term (III.c) is an interaction eect between competitors of rm 1. If one competitor sets a atter supply function, then the other (N − 2) competitors will be more competitive, and the residual demand that rm 1 faces decreases.
In the Allaz and Vila (1993) We can now obtain some intuition on the incentives of rm 1 to make output inelastic or even downward sloping. This can be seen most easily in a duopoly setting (N = 2) in which case term (III.c) is zero. It follows from (23) that it is 'costly', either in terms of a reduced quantity or a reduced price, to set a positive slope Q 1 > 0, because it makes its competitor's residual demand curve more elastic, which increases its output (term III.b becomes larger). Thus we would expect that rm 1 would nd it optimal to keep this slope relatively small or even negative. To achieve this and still sell a signicant amount, it will be optimal to produce a relatively large quantity at p = 0 and then to keep output fairly inelastic or even backward bending in the whole price range. This is the result that we get in the next section.
Closed-form solutions
Relying on the propositions of section 4, this section derives closed-form solutions of our model, and discusses the welfare eect of derivatives trading.
Market equilibrium
We make the following simplifying assumptions in order to explicitly solve for an EPEC equilibrium that is on the equilibrium path of an -PO SPNE.
Assumption 2 Production costs are zero, the demand function D(p) = −γp is linear with γ > 0 and demand shocks are Pareto distributed of the second-order, so that f (ε) = β 1/α (αε + β)
−1/α−1 for ε > 0, where β > 0 and α ∈ (−∞,
).
The Pareto distribution of the second-order is a family of probability distributions with a wide range of properties (Johnson et al., 1994) . For example, for α = 0 it gives the exponential distribution and for α = −1, the uniform distribution.
Proposition 8 (Closed-Form) Under Assumption 2 the unique symmetric EPEC 21 This term can be understood better by looking at a standard Stackelberg game with one leader and N − 1 followers. The leader sets output, taken into account the subsequent reaction of its followers. Each follower sets its output such that its marginal revenue equals marginal costs, which is zero in our model. Hence, for each follower j, Q j + pD = 0. The output of one follower is Q j = |D | p, and total output of all followers is given by (N − 1) |D | p.
equilibrium is given by:
The equilibrium is on the equilibrium path of an -PO SPNE for any > 0.
Proof. Lemma 1 shows that under Assumption 2 the unique solution of the set of dierential equations (13-15) is given by the linear equations (24) (25) (26) . It follows from Johnson et al. (1994) that the Pareto distribution of the second-order has a nite variance when α <
. We also note that under Assumption 2 we have
Thus it follows from Propositions 5-7 that the solution is an EPEC equilibrium that is on the equilibrium path of an -PO SPNE for any > 0. Figure 3 illustrates the results of Proposition 8 for the special case where N = 2 and the demand shock is uniformly distributed.
We notice that with linear demand, the contracting and output functions are linear for a Pareto distribution of the second order. The net-supply
is up-ward sloping, but the contracting function is downward sloping; producers sell forward contracts and buy call options for strike prices above zero. The output function is also backward bending for N > 2 or when α < 0. Hence rms produce less, although the demand shock increases. As a result prices increase steeply as demand shocks increase. Even in the alternative case where total output is forward bending (duopoly N = 2 and α ≥ 0), the total output curve is still very steep. The slope of the total output as a function of price is less than |D |, the slope of monopoly output.
As demand shocks become more uncertain (α increases), 22 the anti-competitive consequences of contracts are mitigated: Q (0) increases and Q (p) becomes less negative. However, even for the highest level of demand uncertainty that we consider α = 1 (N −1)N total supply remains backward bending for N > 2. In the limit where demand is certain (α → −∞), total supply will converge to Q (p) → − |D | p, which is less than the monopoly output. Thus for suciently small α, social welfare is lower than in a monopoly market without contracts.
It is also straightforward to verify that total forward sales, X (0), increases with the number of rms. This ensures that the market becomes more competitive for low shock outcomes. However, the total output function will bend backwards more, when the number of rms increase;Q (p) decreases with more rms in the 22 For α ≤ 0, the demand shock range is 0, β |α| , so a less negative α increases the range of demand shocks. For α ≥ 0, a larger α increases the thickness of the tail of the demand density (Holmberg, 2009 ). market. Thus for α ≥ 0 (when the support of the shock density is innite) the market will be less competitive for the highest shock outcomes if there are more rms in the market. Hence, our nding that rms have incentives to use option contracts to commit to fairly inelastic or even a backward bending output, becomes more apparent in markets with more rms. We attribute this to the interaction eect between competitors, term III.c in (23).
Welfare eects
Proposition 9 (Deadweight Loss) The expected deadweight loss Λ for the equilibrium in Proposition 8 is:
Proof. It follows from (24) that:
. As in Holmberg and Newbery (2010) , the welfare loss for a given demand shock ε is the deadweight-loss:
otherwise while the expected welfare loss is given by
and T (x) = f (x). We can now evaluate the expected loss by twice integrating by parts.
Note that the rst two terms are zero as long as α < 1 2
, because ε = −β α if α < 0 and ε = ∞ otherwise. Welfare losses are quadratic in ε, therefore Λ 2 γ is a constant.
We get (27) by substituting A =
We now discuss the eect of the number of rms on the market's competitiveness.
Proposition 10 Under Assumption 2, the expected deadweight loss for the equilibrium in Proposition 8 decreases with the number of symmetric rms.
Proof. The expected welfare loss is given by (27). Lemma 2 in the Appendix
) is decreasing with respect to N which proves the result.
It follows from (27) that the market becomes perfectly competitive (no welfare losses) if the number of rms N goes to innity and α ≤ 0.
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Proposition 11 (Welfare Comparison) Expected welfare is lower for the equilibrium in Proposition 8 than for a standard Cournot model without contracting where demand shocks are realized before rms choose production, provided that N = 2 and Assumption 2 is satised.
Proof. From the rst-order condition of the Cournot market with certain demand it follows that the total duopoly output is: Q = 2γp. The market clears when Q = ε − γp, so P Cournot (ε) = ε 3γ .
As before the deadweight loss for a given ε is:
We can calculate the expected welfare losses (1 − α) (1 − 2α) .
23 Note that Assumption 2 does not allow for α > 0 when N → ∞.
Comparing the welfare losses in the Cournot game above and the welfare losses in Proposition 9 for N = 2, we nd that:
(1 − 2α)
2−1/α , which is larger than 1 according to Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
Prices for a symmetric SFE without contracts are below the Cournot schedule (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989; Green and Newbery, 1992) , i.e. prices in a Cournot equilibrium where demand shocks are realized before rms set production quantity.
Thus Proposition 11 has the following implication:
Corollary 1 The introduction of a derivatives market will lower welfare, provided that N = 2, Assumption 2 is satised, and rms play the unique symmetric EPEC equilibrium after the reform. 
Conclusion
Commodity derivatives such as forwards and call options are very useful hedging instruments. However, in an oligopoly market they will also be used strategically.
In Allaz and Vila's (1993) seminal study strategic contracting is pro-competitive.
However, it is limited in that rms cannot use contracts to commit to a downward sloping supply. In our study, which has a less restrictive strategy space, strategic contracting has anti-competitive consequences.
Solving for an equilibrium of a two-stage game with derivative trade followed by spot market competition, we show that risk-neutral producers sell forward contracts and buy call option contracts. This contracting strategy commits them to a fairly inelastic or even downward sloping supply function in the spot market.
This is protable as it will give competitors incentives to increase their markups. The forward sales improve competition for low demand realizations, but the option contracts reduce competition for high demand realizations. Hence commodity derivatives are pro-competitive for low demand, but anti-competitive during high demand. In a duopoly market, the second eect outweighs the rst and total surplus decreases when the nancial market is introduced. Total forward sales increase in a less concentrated market (more rms), which improves the low demand pro-competitive eect. In expectation having more rms in the market also reduces welfare losses, even if the anti-competitive eect at high demand becomes more pronounced.
We show that the anti-competitive eects worsen when demand uncertainty is smaller. When demand uncertainty becomes larger, it is optimal for rms to oer supply functions that have a less negative slope, as this allows them to benet more from both high and low demand realizations. Thus to avoid the anti-competitive eect of speculation, this suggests that option contracts should not be traded near delivery because rms then have a good estimate of demand.
Alternatively, the same option contract or supply function should be valid for several delivery periods in order to increase demand variation. 24 Moreover, market monitors should carefully scrutinize incidents where producers use contracts in a speculative manner.
In our model producers are risk neutral and arbitrage in the nancial market is perfect. Therefore, commitment by nancial derivatives is costless. As this is not the case in practice, our results should be seen as a limiting case. With risk aversion, rms are expected to reduce tail risk and to hold contracting portfolios that are closer to their actual output, and therefore to oer supply functions that are more upward sloping. Thus contracting should be pro-competitive with sucient risk-aversion. Also transaction costs in the nancial market are likely to reduce the protability of speculative positions. Considering such imperfections in contracting is likely to reduce the anti-competitive eect for high demand and the pro-competitive eect for low demand realizations.
In our study rms use call options and forward contracts to commit to downward sloping supply. Unlike spot markets with Cournot competition (Willems, 2005) , our results should not depend on whether option contracts are nancial or physical. It follows from the call-put parity that rm's could make the same commitment by put options and forward contracts. In practice rms could also use commitment tactics other than nancial contracts, for instance by delegating decisions to managers, merging with downstream rms, and making irreversible investments. We believe that the main intuition of our paper, that rms would like to commit to downward sloping supply functions, remains valid in those settings.
In this sense our result has parallels in Zöttl (2010) , who models the strategic (irreversible) investments of rms, where rms compete on quantities in a spot market with random demand. He shows that rms will over-invest in technology with low marginal costs (base-load), but choose total investment capacities that are too low from a welfare viewpoint.
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